In 1990, the U.S. News & World Report (USNWR) extended the coverage of its college rankings from only the top 25 to all national universities and colleges. This paper utilizes this exogenous information shock to identify the impact of college quality information on the financial resources of public colleges. Using college level data from 1987 to 1995, we have three main findings: first, USNWR coverage causes colleges to increase educational and general expenditures per student. Second, these expenditure responses are funded by a 6.5% increase in state appropriations per student, but tuition revenue does not respond. Third, the state appropriation response to USNWR exposure is larger the larger the pre-college age population, voter turnout and USNWR newsstand sales are in a state. These heterogeneous responses are consistent with the USNWR rankings reducing the scope for political agency. Thus our results suggest that, in addition to a consumer response, the publication of quality rankings may influence the provision of quality through a political channel.
Introduction
Ranking non-profit services has become a popular theme nationwide. Not only do quality rankings feature prominently in national magazines, some governments even construct and publicize quality "report cards" for hospital care and education. 1 These industries receive enormous attention in quality rankings because their services are highly valued by the public but the service quality is difficult to measure, both of which also lead to an important role of non-profit organizations. 2 For the same reasons, the rankings (especially those provided by national magazines) have the potential to reach a much larger audience than prospective consumers alone.
Since many non-profit services are funded by governments and private donors who also read the rankings, the impact of quality rankings may be fundamentally different in for-profit and non-profit industries. While better informed consumers may motivate for-profit firms to lower prices and/or improve quality, rankings of non-profit services may deliver new information to contributors as well, and therefore reshape the behavior of non-profit firms via a different channel. 3 College rankings provide an ideal opportunity to study non-consumer responses to quality information in a non-profit industry. Every fall, the U.S. News & World Report (USNWR) publishes its "America's Best Colleges" issue, generating an enormous debate about the pros and cons of college rankings. Since virtually all four-year colleges (including universities) in the 1 For example, in early 1990s, the states of New York and Pennsylvania mandated public report cards on the hospital-and surgeon-specific mortality rates of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeries. California also issued hospital report cards based on the mortality rates of acute myocardial infarction (AMI) surgeries. Forprofit and non-profit hospitals both have significant market share, making hospital services an industry with an important degree of non-profit involvement. See Dranove et al. (2003) and Romano & Zhou (2004) for more details. In light of the No Child Left Behind Act, many states publicize report cards of primary/secondary education based on standardized student test scores and tie school funding to these report cards. See Kane and Staiger (2002) for an overview.
2 The literature suggests that non-profit firms are more likely to arise when product quality is difficult to observe or measure (Hansmann (1980) , James and Rose-Ackerman (1986) , Easley and O'Hara (1983) ). In accordance, empirical evidence suggests that non-profit firms may provide higher quality than for-profit firms, although the higher quality comes with higher price and lower cost-efficiency (see Rose-Ackerman (1996) for a comprehensive review).
3 In theory, better information about product attributes (price or quality) usually promotes competition along the informed dimensions (e.g. cutting price or enhancing quality), but these changes are not necessarily welfare enhancing. See Chan and Leland (1982) , and Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) for more details. Empirical evidence can be found at Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) and Jin and Leslie (2003) .
United States are non-profit, contributions from governments and private donors account for more than half of the total revenue. This is especially true for public colleges, where the state government is the largest contributor (40-50% of the total revenue) and tuition payments are small (15-17%) . This implies that a consumer response, while surely important, is hardly central to understanding the full effect of rankings on the decisions of suppliers.
Moreover, the wide circulation of the USNWR college rankings issue reaches a much larger audience than prospective students alone. The "America's Best Colleges" issue drives USNWR's typical newsstand sales up by 40%, reaching an end audience of 11 million people (Dichev (2001) ). The identity of this non-consumer audience ranges from (1) state governments that are directly responsible for allocating appropriation funding to public colleges, to (2) college alumni who value the reputation of their former college, and to (3) the voting public who may not attend college but have a keen interest in higher education due to positive externalities from educational attainment. 4 These audiences have a direct influence on the amount of financial resources allocated to colleges, and their preferences may be reflected in tuition policy, admission criteria, the profile of the faculty, and the campus activities of a college.
In light of these observations, this study focuses on public colleges and examines the impact of USNWR rankings on the financial resources per student of a college. It would be tempting to answer this question by simply regressing changes in college revenue on changes in the actual USNWR rank of a college. However, because unobserved changes in the demand or supply of college quality can affect both the rank and the level of financial resources a college has, this simple strategy will yield a biased estimate. Any unobserved decision to change the level of financial resources in a college will result in a change in the college's USNWR rank due to the importance of the level of resources in the USNWR rankings. 5
To circumvent the potential endogeneity of college ranks, we exploit a large, exogenous shift in the scope of USNWR rankings. Starting 1990, the USNWR covered all four-year national colleges in addition to its traditional top 25 lists. This expansion represents first-time exposure for 229 national colleges to the USNWR rankings. If this exposure generates a discrete incentive 4 See Moretti (2004) and Peri and Ciccone (2006) for recent estimates of positive externalities arising from increased educational attainment. 5 More specifically, financial resources account for a 10-20% weight in the USNWR rankings and many other factors incorporated in the ranking algorithm (including faculty quality, student quality and educational equipment) are heavily dependent on the availability and use of financial resources. Lagged rank may not address the endogeneity problem if there is autocorrelation over time within a college, or if there is an omitted variable affecting changes in both financial resources and the rank of a college.
shift to improve (USNWR-defined) quality, these added-in colleges ("added-ins") should behave differently from those that were ranked before 1990 ("previous-ins") and those who never made the rankings ("never-ins"). Essentially, we are looking at the treatment of being newly included in the rankings and comparing it to the control states of either already being in the rankings, or of never being in the rankings. Because the timing of the expansion in the scope in the rankings was largely a managerial decision within the USNWR, and the USNWR definition of national colleges followed the preexisting Carnegie Classification, this comparison allows us to identify the causal impact of information exposure on the financial resources a college supplies.
In 1990, the U.S. News & World Report (USNWR) extended the coverage of its college rankings from only the top 25 to all national universities and colleges. This paper utilizes this exogenous information shock to identify the impact of college quality information on the financial resources of public colleges. Using college level data from 1987 to 1995, we have three main findings: first, USNWR coverage causes colleges to increase educational and general expenditures per student. Second, these expenditure responses are funded by a 6.5% increase in state appropriations per student, but tuition revenue does not respond. Third, the state appropriation response to USNWR exposure is larger the larger the pre-college age population, voter turnout and USNWR newsstand sales are in a state. These heterogeneous responses are consistent with the USNWR rankings reducing the scope for political agency. Thus our results suggest that, in addition to a consumer response, the publication of quality rankings may influence the provision of quality through a political channel.
The role that the USNWR rankings play in reducing in the scope for political agency echoes a growing literature regarding the impact of media coverage on government behavior. Because government officials are imperfect agents for voting citizens, media reports may provide citizens with new information about the quality of government services. As shown in political agency models, this enhanced information may push the government to improve service delivery along visible dimensions (Borcherding and Deacon (1972) , Mondak (1995) , Brians and Wattenberg (1996) , Persson and Tabellini (2000) ). Recent studies provide evidence in support of the theory: Stromberg (2004) finds that the introduction of radio broadcasting has a positive impact on local government spending in unemployment relief. Besley and Burgess (2002) find that newspaper coverage strengthens the government response to natural disasters in India. Ferraz and Finan (2006) find that the increased audit of municipal expenditure in Brazil reduces the incumbent's likelihood of re-election, and the effect is more pronounced in municipalities with radio stations. 6
6 Our finding that USNWR college rankings reduce the scope for political agency is similar to what Dyck and Zingales (2004) have shown for corporate governance. In their study, the diffusion of the press affects the amount
The agency problem underlying the state funding of public colleges is also similar to the political agency problem prevailing in primary and secondary education. However, because the choice of primary and secondary education is restricted by residential location, it is possible to address the agency problem via Tiebout choices (see Tiebout (1956) and Hoxby (1999) ). The possibility that school choice alleviates the political agency problem and positively affects school productivity has been investigated by a number of studies (Hoxby (2000) , Jacob, Cullen and Levitt (2005) , and Rothstein (2006) are just a few recent contributions). This solution may be less applicable to the higher education sector, as colleges often compete across state boundaries and it may be more costly to migrate across states than across school districts. Another set of reforms designed to alleviate the political agency problem in primary and secondary education is increased school accountability. School accountability has been studied in terms of the effect on residential choices and housing values (see Figlio and Lucas (2004) , and Staiger, Kane and Samms (2003) ), the effect on student performance (Hanushek and Raymond (2005) , and Rouse (2006)), and whether colleges spend accountability rewards in a productive fashion (Bacolod, Dinardo and Jacobson (2006)).
We believe that our finding of an important non-consumer response to USNWR rankings in higher education is also relevant for other industries. An important non-consumer response to quality rankings is likely to arise in industries where (1) a large component of the industry is non-profit, (2) the supply of services rely on public funding and/or private donations, and (3) quality rankings provide new information to the eventual contributors. One important, and widely studied, industry that meets these criteria is healthcare. In this sense, our study is complementary to a range of studies of the healthcare industry that focus on consumer responses to report cards (Dranove and Sfekas (2006) ), consumer responses to hospital rankings (Pope (2006) ), the change in service quality after the introduction of report cards (Dranove et al. (2003) ), the design of report cards (Kessler (2005) ), and the consequences of additional public funding for the delivery of non-profit services (Duggan (2000) , and Baicker and Staiger (2005)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the history of USNWR rankings and reviews existing studies on the USNWR rankings. Section 3 describes the data and lays out the econometric specification. Sections 4 and 5 report empirical findings, and Section of corporate value that insiders appropriate for themselves, because an active press allows outside investors to better monitor a public company. However, unlike stockholders who have a natural interest in profit maximization, contributors to non-profit organizations often face an objective function that is harder to define and monitor. In this sense, the agency problem between non-profit entities and their public/private donors is likely more severe, leading more room for the media coverage to have a detectable effect.
6 concludes.
History of USNWR rankings
Today, more than 100 college guidebooks target the market of undergraduate admission. Although the USNWR was not the first national magazine to have a special college issue, it was the first to deliver numerical rankings of post-secondary institutions to the public. 7 Every year, USNWR sells over 2.2 million copies of its college ranking issue, driving its typical newsstand sales up by 40% and reaching an end audience of 11 million people (Dichev (2001) ). Plus the annual sales of 700,000 copies of the related college guidebook, the USNWR rankings account for nearly half of the total market of 6.7 million copies of college guide publications. 8
The scope of the USNWR rankings
When the USNWR published the first ranking issue in 1983, it focused on the top 10 colleges in four categories: national universities, national liberal arts colleges, regional universities and regional liberal arts colleges. The grouping was based on the 1976 Carnegie Classification of
Institutions of Higher Education. The later two categories were further classified by region, and therefore the number of colleges ranked was much higher in the regional categories than in the national ones. The rankings were derived from an academic reputation survey, in which the USNWR asked the presidents of all four year colleges and universities to name the five best undergraduate colleges that belonged to the same Carnegie Classification as their own institution. The same structure was used in 1985.
In 1987, the USNWR expanded the scope of its rankings to include the top 25 national universities and the top 25 national liberal arts colleges, while the regional rankings continued to include only the top 10 colleges. Starting in 1988, USNWR rankings became an annual event and the ranking coverage expanded to include the top 25 colleges in all four categories. In addition, the ranking criteria began to include self-reported statistics, while the weight on the Figure 1 illustrates the structural changes in the USNWR rankings from 1983 to 1995. This paper focuses on the largest change in the ranking scope, namely, the inclusion of national quartiles in 1990. To the best of our knowledge the timing of this change in scope was driven by a USNWR managerial decision and does not reflect underlying changes in the supply or demand for state funding of higher education. Furthermore, the degree of scope expansion in 1990
was determined by the pre-existing Carnegie Classification of colleges which groups institutions of into national universities and colleges. These two features lead us to believe that this shock allows us to estimate the casual effect of college quality information on the allocation of resources 9 Other sources include the American Association of University Professors, the College Board, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Council for Aid to Education and the U.S. Department of Education. 10 The biggest exception is that USNWR stopped using yield rate in 2003, largely in response to college complaints. 11 In the magazine issue, the rankings of regional colleges have always been restricted to top 15 or top 10 by region. The related USNWR college guidebook started to report regional quartiles in 1993. Because the magazine issue reaches much broader audience, we focus on the changes in the magazine issue. In 1995, national colleges in the first quartile were given specific ranks, expanding the rank list from top 25 to top 50. Compared to the 1990 change, this did not expand the scope of the ranking at all. Rather it gave more detailed information about the relative quality within the first quartile of the two national categories.
to higher education.
The Components of the USNWR rankings
While the USNWR rankings are presented as if it is a comprehensive and objective metric of college quality, the ranking methodology has been hotly debated (NORC (1997) , Clarke (2000) , Dichev (2001) ). An ideal measure of the quality of an undergraduate education would be the value added for a freshman completing his/her education at a given college. In reality, this valueadded approach is not implementable because: (1) output is difficult to measure due to the lack of data on post-education outcomes for each cohort of graduates at every college, and (2) high ability students sort into high quality colleges and therefore unbiased estimates of college-specific value added are very difficult to obtain. As a compromise, most existing measures of college quality focus on a long list of college inputs while assigning small weights to crude measures of output such as retention and graduation rates. 12
The USNWR rankings are no exception. Table 1 describes the variables and weights used to compute the 1990 USNWR rankings. In addition to the survey measure of academic reputation (a 25% weight), four groups of college-level statistics were employed in the 1990 rankings: student selectivity (25%), faculty quality (25%), financial resources (20%), and student satisfaction (5%). More specifically, student selectivity measures are based on the acceptance rate, the yield rate, the high school class standing, and the average SAT/ACT scores of the the incoming freshmen class. Faculty quality is measured by the full-time student-faculty ratio, 
The USNWR Rankings Debate
We are unaware of any academic research which addresses our question directly. Most existing research on the impact of college rankings focuses on their impact on the market of freshmen admission. Based on a national freshmen survey of 1995, McDonough et al. (1998) finds that about 11% of freshmen respondents report that college rankings are a very important factor in their decision to attend a particular college, and that the students who use college rankings were usually A-students from high-income, college-educated families. In a more recent study, Monks and Ehrenberg (1999) examine the relationship between the actual USNWR rank and a number of admission outcomes in the following enrollment year for 30 high-quality private colleges from 1987 to 1997. They find that a one-rank decrease in the USNWR ranking corresponds to a statistically significant increase in the admission rate, a decrease in the yield rate, a decline in the average freshmen SAT scores, and a reduction in aid adjusted tuition. In a different study, Griffith and Rask (2005) focus on more than 4,000 students who were admitted by Colgate University and found that Colgate's UNSWR rank had an important and expected impact on the yield.
Both studies do not address the endogeneity of a college's rank. Their estimates may be biased if changes in a college's USNWR rank are correlated with some unobserved factors that affect student admission in both current and previous years such as changes in unobserved variables affecting the supply or demand for college quality. Pope (2006) addresses this endogeneity problem by exploiting the fact that explicit weight changes in the USNWR ranking methodology generate variation in a college's ranking which should be independent from a colleges unobserved quality. Focusing on the top 25 universities listed in the USNWR magazines from 1990 to 2001, he first predicts a colleges rank if the USNWR continues the same methodology from the year before. He then uses the difference between the actual rank and the predicted as an instrument for the actual rank. Using this instrumental variables strategy Pope finds that a one rank down change in the USNWR rank led to a higher acceptance rate, and a reduction in the average expenditures can be decomposed into eight academic functions: (1) instruction, (2) research, (3) public service, (4) academic support (which includes library), (5) student service, (6) institutional support, (7) operation and maintenance of plant, and (8) scholarships and fellowships. Since 1992, the USNWR has categorized these functions into two groups: the first group is comprised of instruction, academic support, student services and institutional support, the sum of which are calculated on the basis of per full-time-equivalent student. The second group includes research, public service, scholarships, and plant operation and maintenance (public service was added in 1993). Unlike the first group, this second group is weighted by the proportion of undergraduate FTEs in the total student body and thus become less important in the ranking algorithm.
SAT score of entering students. However, the validity of this IV strategy is called into question by the fact that each year the USNWR organizes regular meetings with high school counselors, institutional researchers, and admission deans from a wide range of colleges to discuss changes to the ranking methodology (Morse (2004) , USNWR (2000)). This opens the possibility that USNWR may have changed ranking weights in response to college requests to better measure their quality.
Another focus of the debate is whether colleges respond to the rankings. This debate is much closer to the central question of our study, however there has been little systematic research on this topic. The best evidence comes from an email survey of 694 college presidents conducted by the Association of Governing Boards (AGB) in 2001. This survey asked how college presidents and their boards regard the USNWR rankings (Levin (2002)). Among the 241 respondents, 76% reported that the USNWR rankings was very or somewhat important to the institution, 67% discussed the rankings in the board meeting, and 51% had ever attempted to improve the ranking. In addition, 36% of the respondents announced their rankings in press releases, 50%
used the rank as internal benchmarks, and 32% used the rankings to measure their progress relative to peers. This evidence is suggestive of a college response to the USNWR rankings.
3 Data Summary and Econometric Specification
Data Sources
The heart of the paper hinges on two major data sources: the USNWR magazines and the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). As detailed below, a complete collection of the USNWR ranking issues since 1983 helps us define treatment and control groups.
While the USNWR publications provide some information on the variables of interest for the ranked colleges, it is necessary to track both ranked and unranked colleges before and after 1990.
The IPEDS is a census of all the colleges operating in the U.S. collected by the Department of Education which provides basic institutional information such as degrees offered, private/public status, tuition, enrollment, faculty resources, and detailed financial information on revenue and expenditure.
Since the IPEDS does not collect information on all the variables of interest, we supplement it with data from the College Board Annual Survey of Colleges (CBASC). Focusing on four-year colleges, CBASC collects detailed information on the number of applications received, the number of admissions granted, the 25 and 75 percentiles of SAT scores of the freshmen class (henceforth SAT25 and SAT75), etc. While the universe for the CBASC is all four-year colleges in the U.S., on average 85% respond every year. Among the respondents, the percentage of valid answers varies by question: for example, almost all the responding colleges report enrollment and tuition, but the response rates on SAT25 and SAT75 are less than 50%, probably because not all colleges require the SAT or ACT for admission. We merge IPEDS and CBASC data for enrollment years 1987 to 1995. 14 IPEDS and CBASC data are further merged with the ranking issues of USNWR by year and institution name. 15
We also utilize state-level data in our analysis of heterogeneous responses to the USNWR information shock. We compute at the state-level the percentage of the population who are college age (age 18-22, referred to as COLAGEP OP ) and the percentage of the population who are pre-college age (age 16-18, referred to as P RECOLP OP ) from the 1990 Census. 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 . 16 The 1990 Census collects information on the 1989 population and therefore precedes the 1990 expansion of the USNWR rankings. 17 Specifically, we compute SEAT ADV G by first calculating the absolute difference between the number of republican seats and the number of democrat seats and then dividing by the total number seats. 18 The 1989 rankings were published in the Oct. 16 issue. ABC audits the total number of paid circulation for every issue of USNWR, but only breaks it down to state level for one random issue every half year.
to magazine content and that advertising rates are more responsive to newsstand sales than to regular subscriptions.
The newsstand-subscription distinction is very clear around the time of USNWR rankings.
In Figures 2A and 2B , we pick three USNWR issues each year -the rankings issue and the issues immediately before and after the rankings -and plot the nationwide total of USNWR subscription and newsstand sales from 1987 to 1995. In every year the national newsstand sales of the rankings issue were much higher than the issues before and after, while the regular subscriptions were insensitive to the rankings issue. These figures suggest that if USNWR reduces the scope for political agency the response of state funding for higher education to USNWR ranking should be more related to newsstand sales than to regular subscriptions.
Sample Summary
We draw our initial sample from the IPEDS data. According to the IPEDS data, there were 1641 four-year colleges that offer at least one Bachelor's degree in 1987. We further restrict our sample by excluding (1) The number of FTEs is calculated by taking the total number of full time students (undergraduates and graduates combined) plus one third of the total number of part-time students. 20 In any specific year before 1990, the number of regional ranked colleges is less than 100, but the number of regional previous-ins is much larger than 100 because the identities of ranked colleges have fair amount of turnover. In contrast, the list of national previous-ins is very stable from year to year.
regional colleges such as the University of Central Florida and St. Mary's College of Maryland.
The 1990 expansion of the USNWR rankings added in all of the national colleges that did not make the USNWR rankings before 1990. We denote these colleges as "added-ins". The definition of a national college is based on the 1987 Carnegie Classification of Colleges. By definition, an added-in must be a national college, and a national college is either a previous-in or an addedin college. Strictly speaking the 1990 expansion of the USNWR rankings also increased the probability of a national previous-in college being covered by the USNWR rankings. Since this change is smaller for the previous-ins than for the added-ins, our main analysis focuses on the added-ins a the treatment group and classifies the national previous-ins in the control group. 21
As shown in Table 2 , these three groups of colleges were systematically different even before the 1990 expansion of USNWR rankings. This is partly driven by the Carnegie Classification of college types, and partly by the definition of USNWR rankings. Although an average added-in had more resources per student than the average regional previous-in college, it did not appear in the USNWR rankings before 1990 because its statistics were not good enough to rank within the national category. In 1987, the average expenditure per student was clearly ordered (from low to high) by never-ins, regional previous-ins, added-ins, and national previous-ins, with the added-ins closer to the regional previous-ins than to the national previous-ins. This order did not change in 1995, but the added-ins had an impressive 58% increase from 1987 to 1995. This increase is significantly higher than that of the never-in (49%) or all the previous-in regional and national colleges (48%). These summary statistics suggest that the 1990 exposure in USNWR lead to colleges providing more resources per student.
To get a sense of how different the mix of financial resources is across different types of colleges, in Table 3 we display (in the form of a balance sheet) the mean of each major accounting variable (as of 1987) for the added-ins and the control group as a whole. 22 On average, the addedins have more resources per student than the control colleges, but the composition is similar: on the revenue side, more than 97% of government appropriations come from state governments, and state appropriations account for 40-50% of the total revenue. In comparison, tuition and fees account for 14-18% of the revenue, with the rest coming from government contracts, private gifts and contracts, endowment and other sources. On the expenditure side, the vast majority falls into educational and general expenditures. Within the educational and general expendi-
21
In robustness checks we show that excluding the national previous-ins from the control group does not change our central conclusions.
22 Note that the sample for each estimate presented in the table may differ slightly for each variable as the sample is conditional on the college reporting the studied financial item in our analysis sample in every year.
tures, roughly 40% goes to instruction, 24-28% to administration (including academic support, student services and institutional support), 8-11% to plant operation and maintenance, 5-7% to scholarships and fellowships, and the rest is allocated to research and public services. Although the 1990 USNWR rankings include all the items in the educational and general expenditures, after 1992 more weight in the ranking algorithm has been given to instruction and administration than to research, public services, plant operation, and scholarships. For this reason we report two additional numbers in Table 3 : one for the sum of instruction and administration expenditures (labeled as U SN W RM AIN EXP ) and the other is for the sum of all the eight categories (labeled as U SN W RALLEXP ). We feel that this second variable better reflects the USNWR defined measure of expenditure for the sample period, but report both for completeness.
Main Specification
The central question we seek to answer in this study is whether exposure to USNWR rankings effects the financial resources of a college. We answer this questions in a simple difference-indifference framework. Our main specification is:
where y it denotes the dependent variable we examine, α i denotes college fixed effects, λ t denotes a set of year effects, D addedin,i is a dummy variable for a college i being an added-in college, D t>=1991 is a dummy variable indicating a year after the 1990 expansion, and it is the error term independent of all the regressors. Since D addedin,i does not vary over time it is absorbed into the college fixed effects. Similarly, D t>=1991 is absorbed into the year fixed effects. For this reason D addedin,i and D t>=1991 only enter into the specification as an interaction. The coefficient of interest is β which reflects the impact of USNWR information exposure on the outcome y it .
In most of our analysis the relevant outcome will be the log of a financial variable per student. Since some financial variables do not apply to all colleges (for example research and public services), the sample for each regression is for the colleges that report the dependent variable in question every year of the sample. There is some ambiguity in the precise timing of a governmental response to the change in scope of the rankings in 1990 so our main analysis focuses on the comparison for enrollment years 1987-1989 versus 1991-1995. 23 The financial data for enrollment year t are referred to as the revenues and expenditures incurred in the fiscal year t + 1, which usually ends at June 30. Since the 1990 USNWR rankings were published 23 As detailed below, adding enrollment year 1990 as after the shock does not change our central conclusions.
in the Oct. 15 issue, the shift in the ranking scope should not affect who enrolled as freshmen in September 1990 but might have influenced the amount of financial resources received and spent up to the end of the fiscal year 1991. More specifically, the intial state budget for a public college is most likely determined before the start of a fiscal year, but the budget is subject to change during the year. 24 We estimate the standard errors with an arbitrary covariance matrix to address the fact that inclusion in the USWNR is a permanent shock and the outcomes we study are likely to be autocorrelated within the same college (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) ).
The validity of the difference-in-difference estimate as a parameter of interest hinges on colleges in the treated and control groups following the same trends over time in absence of the treatment. While this assumption is untestable we are able to examine its plausibility by testing whether the treatment and control colleges follow the same trend before the treatment occurs.
This is important in this context because the analysis in Hoxby (2004) shows significant patterns of divergence in the college market in many of the variables we examine. We show in what follows that these patterns of divergence which Hoxby finds in her analysis before the treatment do not hold in general in our sample. The fact that our sample period is much shorter than in Hoxby (2004) and that our sample set of colleges is more homogeneous likely explains the differences between our results and hers. Another key assumption for the standard interpretation of β as a casual effect in difference-in-difference models is that the control group is unaffected by the treatment. We suspect that this may not be true in this context given that a state government decides the amount of state appropriations for each college in a state simultaneously. We present evidence and interpretation on this point below.
4 Main Results
Central USNWR variables
In this section we examine how each of the key components of the USNWR rankings (which we have access to) respond to the USNWR exposure shock. Although financial resources account for 10-20% of the USNWR overall scores and may affect other ranking variables (say faculty quality) indirectly, expenditure per student is at most one of the major criteria used in the 24 Grapevine (http://www.grapevine.ilstu.edu/) provides more detailed information on the extent to which state budgets for higher education may differ at the beginning and end of a fiscal year.
USNWR rankings. Before telescoping into detailed financial terms, we estimate the differencein-difference specification above for each of five ranking variables: (1) acceptance rate, (2) yield rate, (3) SAT25, (4) SAT75, and (5) the log of educational and general expenditure per student.
In Table 4 we take each of the six variables as a dependent variable and report estimates of the coefficient β from the difference-in-difference model above. We also report the p-value from an F-test of whether the treatment and control groups follow the same pretreatment trend to examine the basic plausibility of the difference-in-difference strategy in this context. This test is implemented by conducting the joint test of whether the coefficients on the year dummies differ by treatment status in 1987, 1988, and 1989. Using the conventional confidence level of 95%, we find that the added-ins and the control colleges follow the same pre-treatment trend in all the dependent variables except for U SN W RALLEXP . We show that the noncomparability of U SN W RALLEXP is due to different time trends in plant operation and maintenance expenditure later on.
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that exposure to USNWR rankings has no statistically significant effect on admission outcomes. If anything, the point estimates indicate that freshmen quality (measured by SAT25 and SAT75) slightly declines. In contrast, the results for the impact of USNWR exposure on expenditure are positive (3-4%) and are statistically significant at the 5% level.
The results in Table 4 for the admissions outcomes are quite different than in the previous literature and may seem counterintuitive as the newly exposed colleges should now have an additional incentive to improve the quality of their freshmen class. One potential explanation of results for the admission and expenditure variables could be due to difference in the sample size for the different specifications. Because some colleges failed to report admission outcomes in some years, the samples for acceptance rate, yield rate, SAT25 and SAT75 are significantly smaller than those for the expenditures. This is especially true for the SAT25 and SAT75 variables.
When we run the expenditure regressions for the sample having non-missing values of SAT25, the key coefficients remain positive with slightly smaller magnitude and larger standard errors. 25
Another potential explanation is that colleges (or their owners) may have more discretion in changing expenditures than admission outcomes. Both the acceptance and yield rates depend on student choices of where to apply and where to enroll, and colleges have limited ability influencing these decisions. In comparison, public colleges may be able to adjust expenditure composition internally and negotiate for more revenue with state government. In addition, students will only 25 The t statistics to 1.34 for U SN W RM AIN EXP and 1.98 for U SN W RALLEXP .
respond to the USNWR rankings regime change if it conveys additional information. One further possibility for the lack of an impact of USNWR exposure on admission outcomes could be that potential students were already aware of the information contained in the ranking regime change before it occurred, and college funders or the public are not. Nevertheless, the results in Table   4 do indicate that the largest impact of the USNWR rankings center on college expenditure, so the rest of the paper focuses on understanding the response of financial resources to USNWR exposure. To assess the plausibility of the research design, we conduct pretreatment trend tests for each of the outcome variables. The coefficient estimate is shaded in Table 5 if the corresponding outcome does not pass the test with confidence level 95%. Overall, the pretreatment tests indicate that most financial variables follow similar pretreatment trends in the added-in and the control colleges. Total revenue and total educational and general expenditures do not pass the test because the test fails for government contracts on the revenue side and for plant operations on the expenditure side. The discussion below will focus on the variables which pass the test.
Impact on Revenue and Expenditures
In terms of expenditures, we find that exposure to USNWR rankings leads to a significant increases in instruction, at a magnitude of about 4%. In comparison, changes in the other categories are non-distinguishable from zero (research and administration), weakly negative (public services), eakly positive (scholarships and fellowships) or significantly positive but likely due to different pretreatment trends (plant operations). Overall, the expenditure results indicate that exposure to the USNWR rankings increases expenditure on instruction and scholarships.
The former may improve faculty quality while the latter may improve the academic quality of incoming freshmen. These changes are intuitive, as faculty and student quality are both heavily counted in the USNWR ranking algorithm.
To balance the budget, this increase in the total expenditure of a college must be funded by additional revenue. We find that most of the additional revenue comes from state appropriations. Specifically, USNWR exposure increases state appropriations by 6.5%. But the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero for tuition and fees, government contracts and endowment income, and even negative for private gifts. Although the percentage change in private gifts (-11%) is large and statistically significant, the change is much smaller in absolute dollars compared to state appropriations because state appropriations are a much larger share of revenues. One explanation is that private donors are more reluctant to support the public colleges included in the rankings in anticipation of the state funding response. Another possibility is that the newly exposed colleges receive favorable appropriations from the state and therefore reduce their marketing efforts towards private fund-raising.
In Table 6 we examine whether the state appropriation response is robust to different definitions of the control group and the inclusion of state-year fixed effects. These specifications are important to consider since the magnitude of the estimate we present above may be driven largely by one control group which could be indirectly affected by the treatment. In particular, there is some concern that national previous-in colleges may be partially treated since their chance of being covered has increased from a probability of less than one to one. In the first 3 columns of Table 6 we present the results of specifications using different control groups, and find that, regardless of the definition of the control group, the estimate of β is always positive and statistically significant. Within the three columns, the estimate with the largest magnitude comes from the specification that uses previous-ins as the control group. Thus, the concern of a partial treatment for the national previous-in colleges does not explain our central results.
In columns four and five of In the last two columns of Table 6 , we also include interactions of the previous-in indicator with an after 1990 indicator. The reason to estimate this specification is that the previous-in colleges are similar to the added-ins and therefore may receive significant competition spillovers from the added-ins information shock. This implies that the previous-in colleges may be partially affected by the 1990 expansion of USNWR rankings. We examine whether previous-in colleges experience a different time trend in state appropriations after 1991 (relative to never in colleges)
as competition spillovers would imply. The results indicate that the previous-in colleges do not experience a significant change in state appropriations in response to the 1990 shock (here the implied control group is the never-in colleges). In the last column we do find some weak evidence of an increase in state appropriation resources for the previous-in colleges in 1990, but this coefficient is only significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Moreover, allowing the previous-in colleges to follow a different time trend after 1990 does not alter the magnitude of our parameter of interest significantly This evidence refutes the idea that a strong spillover of the information shock due to competition between the added-in and previous-in colleges drives our central results.
Understanding the State Appropriation Response
The results in Table 5 raise an important question: why does USNWR exposure increase state appropriations? We explore three directions to answer this question. First, we examine whether on the impact of USNWR exposure on state funding varies with demographic and political variables as would be predicted by the rankings reducing the scope for political agency. Second, we assess whether the state appropriation response changes over time or across the four national quartiles as defined in the 1990 rankings. Last, we examine whether the USNWR coverage of the added-in colleges promotes redistribution of state funding from the control colleges to the treated colleges.
Political Agency
To better understand the state appropriation results, the first direction we explore is whether the response of state appropriations to USNWR exposure is consistent with the rankings reducing the scope for political agency. The USNWR rankings may represent an important source of information to state citizens, especially to those who care about public education but are not currently attending a college. If individual voters value the quality of education their state government provides and they can obtain some information about what resources are actually allocated to higher education by the government their political influence may motivate the state government to respond to the USNWR rankings. While the USNWR rankings do not report state appropriation funding directly, state funding and tuition prices at public colleges are topics frequently discussed in many types of media, including newspapers, magazines, TV and radio.
In this sense, the USNWR rankings provide a focal point for the public to pay attention to higher education.
The model of the effect of the media on the scope for political agency presented in Besley and Burgess (2002) implies that the state appropriation response to USNWR should be larger when voters are more active, when the public value education more, and when the USNWR shock informs a larger segment of the public. Below we test for heterogeneous responses along these lines. In particular, we test whether the effect of the 1990 USNWR exposure differs by (1) the state demographic characteristics reflecting the value of college education, namely the percentage of pre-college and college age population (P RECOLP OP and COLAGEP OP ), (2) all these state level variables are standardized by the nationwide mean and standard deviations of the variable so that a value of one indicates that a state is one-standard-deviation higher than the national average for the specific variable. Denoting these variables as HET ERO i , we extend the basic specification above to
where the vector γ captures the heterogeneous effects of the 1990 USNWR exposure on along the lines noted above.
We report the results of these specifications in Table 7 . As a benchmark, column one reports the result from Table 5 , columns two to four examine each set of interactions separately, and column five includes all of the interactions in one specification. In columns two and three of Table 7 we observe results consistent with the rankings reducing the scope for political agency:
the response of state appropriations to USNWR is larger with the percentage of pre-collage age population and voter turnout. Specifically, one standard deviation above the national average of P RECOLP OP leads to 5 percentage point increase in the treatment effect, while one standard deviation above the average of V OT ERT U RN OU T has an incremental effect of 2 percentage points. The interactions of other demographic and political variables with USNWR exposure are not statistically different from zero.
In comparison, columns four and five in Table 7 show that the coefficients corresponding to Due to these correlations, we believe the results in column five of Table 7 In addition to the USNWR rankings leading to a reduction in the scope for political agency, another possibility is that state government acted as an appropriate agent for state citizens preferences but did not know all the information contained in the 1990 USNWR rankings until the issue was published. Under this alternative explanation, the state government response does not depend on how widely the USNWR ranking was circulated in the state. The fact that changes in state appropriations are sensitive to USNWR newsstand sales suggests that the information shock to the state politicians may be dominated by the political agency mechanism.
Does the Response of State Appropriations Differ by Time or USNWR
Ranking Quartile?
In this subsection we examine whether the response to USNWR exposure depends on the time horizon or the informational content of the rankings. If the USNWR primarily impacts state funding of higher education through a reduction in the scope for political agency we should see the response the USNWR occur over a short time horizon. This is because the incentives for state legislators to act as better agents for the voters should change very quickly. On the other hand if the USNWR exposure instead changes the position of the college in terms of its bargaining position with the state government multiple layers of bureaucracy may delay the response to the exogenous information shock. A response over a short time horizon is then more consistent with USNWR reducing the scope for political agency.
To evaluate the relative strength of these two possibilities, we examine whether the impact of USNWR exposure changes over time. As shown in column 3 of Table 8 , the short-run effect (in 1991 and 1992) and long-run effect (in 1993 to 1995) are both statistically significant and very similar in magnitude. In column 2, we also include 1990 as a year after the information shock and re-estimate the treatment effect in this extended sample (recall that the 1990 financial data correspond to revenue and expenditure of a fiscal year ending in the middle of 1991.)
The estimate remains positive and statistically significant, but its magnitude (5.6%) is slightly smaller than the baseline result reported in column 1 (6.5%). This finding is consistent with Figure 3 , which shows that the added-ins and the control colleges followed similar patterns in state appropriations per student before 1990, but the difference began to increase in 1990, was enlarged in 1991, and remained that way afterwards.
Next we examine whether the informational content of the rankings can explain any of the response in state appropriations. The 1990 USNWR rankings classify the added-ins colleges into four quartiles based upon their quality. If all of the previously unranked colleges are perceived as being of equal quality, those that appear in the top two quartiles of the added in group receive a positive shock, whereas those in the bottom quartiles receive a negative shock. This implies that colleges in different quartiles may receive a different response from the state depending on their policy goals.
We examine this conjecture in columns four and five of Table 8 . We find that the effect of state appropriations is concentrated in the third-and fourth-quartile colleges and not statistically significant for colleges in the top two quartiles. One explanation could be that state legislators are embarrassed by the non-favorable classification of their public colleges and in response devote more financial resources to improve them. Another explanation is that the quartile differences are correlated with some other variables, for example, state demographics or political factors.
We will examine this possibility at the end of the next subsection.
Redistribution of State Funding
One key difference between state appropriations and other revenue variables considered above is that state appropriations are allocated by the state government to each college. States may make two different appropriation decisions in response to the USNWR rankings. First, they might increase the level of state appropriations only to colleges that they wish to improve, and leave the level of appropriations for other colleges unchanged. In this case the total state expenditure on higher education would increase. Alternatively states may not increase their level of total expenditure, but simply reallocate their appropriation expenditure towards colleges where they view the quality as being too low. The nature of this reallocation depends on the objective function of the state and where the return to resources is greatest: if the state seeks to maximize the average quality of the colleges in the state it may be optimal to reallocate resources towards improving the best performing colleges. If states seek to ensure that all state colleges provide a minimum quality of education, they may allocate their resources towards improving the lowest quality colleges. Whether or not our results are driven purely by redistribution is important for interpreting our coefficient estimates.
The most straightforward way to examine redistribution would be detect whether the state budget of higher education increased more in states that have many students attending colleges that are added-in after the 1990 expansion of USNWR rankings. Unfortunately, such budget changes could also be a result of state business cycles which generate a significant signal extraction problem. To circumvent this difficulty, we examine the possibility of redistribution by looking at how the impact varies with the size of the 1990 shock for a state. We measure the size of the shock with a variable (P ERST U DIN ADDEDIN ) which reflects the percentage of students attending added-in colleges in a state as of 1987. If state governments react to the information shock by redistributing resources, we should observe a smaller response to USNWR exposure in the states that have more students attending added-in colleges. This occurs because if the state budget for higher education remains fixed each added in college will receive less resources.
In the second column of Table 9 we see that the interaction of P ERST U DIN ADDEDIN with the treatment is positive and statistically significant. This indicates the impact of being included in USNWR on the level of state appropriations is larger if many students in a state attend added-in colleges. This is exactly opposite of what we would find if redistribution between colleges in response to USNWR were driving our main results.
The percentage of students attending colleges which are added to USNWR in 1990 in a state may reflect the demographic environment, political climate or the informational content of the rankings. Because of this fact, we add these additional interactions to the specification in the third column of Table 9 . The results show that the interaction of P ERST U DIN ADDEDIN and the treatment variable is still positive and statistically significant. This provides further evidence that the central results for state appropriations in Table 5 are not driven by redistribution but instead reflect an increase in state spending on higher education. 27
Finally, to examine whether the quartile differences detected in Table 8 are driven by omitted variables, in the fourth column of Table 9 we allow the main effect to differ by the 1990 quartiles and include all the interactions mentioned above. The results suggest that the quartile-specific estimates are much more similar to each other than in Table 8 and the differences in their magnitudes are no longer statistically significant. At the same time the treatment effect remains sensitive to pre-college-age population, voter turnout, USNWR coverage, and the percentage of students attending added-ins colleges in a state. This suggests that the increase of state 27 Additional analysis at the state level also suggests that redistribution is unlikely the main reason driving our results. In an unreported analysis (available from the authors by request), we take state-year as the unit of observation, compute state appropriations per student including all the public colleges within a state, and regress it on the interaction of the after-1990 dummy and the percentage of college students enrolled in the public added-ins as of 1987 (while controlling for state and year fixed effects). The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically different from zero at the 15 percent level. Further state-level examination suggests that the largest increase in the state appropriation per student comes from the states that have the largest percentage of students enrolling in the public add-ins. This is inconsistent with redistribution.
appropriations after the 1990 shock is mostly driven by the political agency mechanism, rather than redistribution or a potentially positive shock for the top two quartiles.
Conclusion
It is widely believed that the United States has the highest quality system of higher education in the world. However, some statistics are alarming: despite the rapid rise in tuition and heavy subsidies from government and private contributors, only 54% of freshmen graduate with a
Bachelor's degree within 6 years (Chronicle of Higher Education (2005)). This gives rise to a long standing question: how to motivate colleges to achieve and maintain quality?
College rankings have the potential to steer colleges towards quality improvement, but does it work? To what extent and through what mechanism does it work? As an early attempt to explore these questions, we exploit the large expansion in the scope of USNWR rankings in 1990. We find that college quality ranking information leads to increases in expenditure in public colleges, most of which is funded by more state appropriations per student. A closer examination finds that state appropriations per student are more responsive to USNWR rankings exposure if a state has more citizens who are politically active, care about higher education, and buy USNWR from the newsstand. These results are consistent with college rankings reducing the scope for political agency in the provision of financial resources to colleges by state governments.
We would like to call attention to a number of caveats underlying our main findings, many of which point to future research. One fruitful direction for future research would be to examine whether the funding increase in response to the USNWR exposure has any impact on college output. In recent work Bound and Turner (2006) have shown that college completion rates are positively related to resources per student. Because their estimates are of the average return to resources they may be larger than the return to additional resources stimulated by college rankings. In this sense, the context of Bacolod, Dinardo and Jacobson (2006) is more similar to ours. They show that accountability awards to secondary colleges in California have little impact on student achievement. This leads us to suspect that the return to resources stimulated by the USNWR coverage may be significantly lower than the estimates in Bound and Turner (2006) would imply. Thus a worthwhile extension of our paper would be to estimate the direct effect of USNWR ranking exposure on college completion rates. The results of these estimates would be important to begin to understand the welfare implications of our findings.
Since financial resources per student represent only one dimension of college quality another important avenue for future work would be to examine whether there is any evidence of a college gaming response to the rankings. If it is less costly to improve on-paper quality (as defined in the ranking algorithm), USNWR rankings may distort college behavior away from improving true quality. To have a sense of whether this is an important concern more extensive data is required, where both true-quality and on-paper quality can be separately measured. The response of alumni giving to the USNWR ranking exposure represents a possible case, since both the fraction of alumni giving and the total dollars donated by alumni are a component of the USNWR definition of quality, but the actual resources donated by alumni are much more likely related to college quality than the fraction of alumni donors.
With all of these directions for future research, it is too early to draw any clear welfare implications from our current findings. While we believe responses in the financial variables we find represent real resources and are not just manipulated statistics on paper, it is not clear whether the response of state appropriations is socially optimal. Because the pressure to improve comes from public attention to media news, state governments may react to improve the dimensions emphasized in the news (for example, state appropriation funding and tuition), but do nothing or even reduce efforts in improving more obscure items (such as faculty research). Such adverse effects have been shown to exist in the context of cardiovascular surgeon report cards (Dranove et al. (2003) ) and similar concerns need to be addressed (or convincingly dismissed) in higher education.
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